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Abstract 
 
The literature suggests Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) and remittances may protect 
poor households from income risk. We present a theoretical framework that explores how 
this ‘insurance’ effect can change households’ decision to apply for a loan via changes in 
credit demand and supply. Empirical evidence from poor rural households in Nicaragua 
shows CCTs did not affect loan requests while remittances increased them. The risk 
protection provided by remittances seems stronger, relative to CCTs, such that 
improvements on borrowers’ expected marginal returns to a loan or on creditworthiness 
more than offset decreasing returns to additional income. This suggests those transfers 
that best protect households from income risk favor financial deepening in the context of 
segmented markets. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The outreach of public and private transfers has been growing considerably in the 
past decade among the poorest living in developing countries. The provision of public 
transfers through Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs, like the renowned 
Oportunidades in Mexico and Bolsa Escola in Brazil, continue to expand as they have 
been shown to encourage investment in education and health among the rural and urban 
poor.  In addition, access to private transfers in the form of remittances has also been 
expanding among the poor as domestic and international migration flows increase. This 
study explores how access to these types of transfers may affect household participation 
in rural credit markets, via changes in credit demand and supply, and contributes to the 
understanding of the possible far-reaching effects these transfers may have on household 
behavior.  
We present a theoretical framework that links the migration and CCT literature with 
that of rural credit markets in developing countries in a way that explains how access to 
these transfers may impact credit market outcomes. We empirically test this framework 
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using panel data from poor rural households participating in a randomized CCT program 
conducted in Nicaragua named Red de Protección Social. Many of these households had 
domestic migrants sending remittances during the same time period, as part of their 
income risk management strategies. We then evaluate the impact that having access to 
CCTs and remittances had on the household’s decision to request a loan, considering the 
exogenous nature of the CCT and the endogenous nature of remittances. 
The literature that explores the motives and effects of migration is vast and it offers 
no single element as the cause for migration (Taylor and Martin, 2001). It suggests that 
migration may be undertaken in order to increase household income and overcome 
liquidity constraints (Lucas, 1987). It may also be a way for households to reduce 
unforeseen income fluctuations. In turn, this protection from income risk may lead to 
changes in investment and consumption decisions that would have not occurred had 
migration not taken place (Stark, 1991). This is the view of the New Economics of Labor 
Migration (NELM) literature, which explains migration as an inter-temporal household 
strategy that reduces income risk by spatially diversifying the household’s portfolio of 
income-generating activities (Stark and Levhari, 1982). In this context, the migrant is 
seen as a member of a geographically extended family who acts in coordination with 
other members to manage and cope with idiosyncratic risk (Dercon, 2002; Fafchamps, 
2007). 
The literature also suggests that public transfers in the form of CCTs may provide 
income risk protection, as households may save part of the transfer and use these savings 
during times of need. There is evidence that CCTs may allow households to cope better 
with idiosyncratic shocks, such that when they occur households are able to keep children 
in school (de Janvry et al., 2006); smooth consumption (Maluccio, 2005); and hold on to 
assets (Alderman and Hoddinott, 2007). 
Given the evidence about the insurance effect of remittances and CCTs on poor 
households, one would expect to also observe an influence on household participation in 
credit markets, as protection from risk may change household risk management strategies 
through improvements in their expectations about future states of the world. The 
literature on credit markets considers these expectations a key determinant of household 
credit demand and supply. This paper contributes to the literature by exploring this 
additional and complex link. 
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Our findings show that CCTs did not have a significant effect on the likelihood of 
requesting a loan, while remittances increased it. The significant positive effect of access 
to remittances suggests that the potential reduction in income risk increases the 
household’s expected marginal returns from a loan or the household’s creditworthiness as 
perceived by lenders in a way that more than offsets the decreasing marginal returns 
caused by the additional income. The net result encourages the decision to request a loan. 
The limited flexibility of CCTs, relative to remittances, in adjusting to the magnitude and 
timing of adverse shocks may explain their weak effect on this household decision. For a 
positive effect to be determined, the improvements in expectations need to be sufficiently 
strong to more than offset decreasing returns to additional income. This evidence 
supports the notion that transfers that best protect poor households from income risk 
favor financial deepening, something that has been shown to have important implications 
in the process of economic development (Berthelemy and Varoudakis, 1996; Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2007). 
The paper is built in the following way.  Sections two and three present a theoretical 
framework that explains the possible effects of access to transfers on the household’s 
decision to request a loan. Section four describes the basic characteristics of the data. 
Section five discusses the main methodological challenges and the results. And section 
six concludes. 
2. The insurance effect of transfers and its implication on credit markets 
The literature that studies credit markets in developing countries is quite vast and we 
highlight its link with the NELM and CCT literature to explain how access to these types 
of transfers may affect household participation in credit markets. In particular, we argue 
that the effect on credit market outcomes is through the modification of the borrower and 
lender expected marginal returns given a possible change in their ability to respond to the 
different states of nature that may occur during the credit contract. 
Some of the prevailing types of lenders in credit markets in developing countries are 
relatives and friends, local moneylenders, input suppliers, product traders, microfinance 
organizations, cooperatives and banks. These lenders coexist because each one has 
informational and contract enforcement advantages over the others, which allow them to 
evaluate creditworthiness in a cost-effective manner only for a certain segment of 
borrowers (Conning and Udry, 2007). However, the difficulty for different types of 
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lenders to obtain relevant information about the credit applicant’s ability and willingness 
to repay leads to several forms of credit rationing. That is, credit markets may not clear, 
as some creditworthy borrowers with a legitimate demand for credit may not get a loan or 
may get a smaller loan than the one desired at the going interest rate due to information 
asymmetries (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), interest rate restrictions set by policy makers 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 1984) or contract enforcement considerations (Bell, 1988). 
In this context, credit demand and supply models such as Kochar (1997) and 
Gonzalez-Vega (1984) formalize the notion that expectations about the different states of 
nature during the credit transaction play a fundamental role in credit market outcomes, 
given the inter-temporal nature of the credit contract. A household decides whether to 
apply for a loan or not after comparing the household’s expected marginal returns from 
the use of the loan and the expected marginal costs attached to the loan. The latter are 
driven in part by the lender’s expected marginal cost of providing the loan to that 
particular household. 
If access to remittances or CCTs protects the household against income risk, then they 
may also improve its expectations about being able to successfully cope with bad states 
of nature or adopt riskier but more productive technologies. This, in turn, may improve 
the household’s expected marginal returns to a loan, increasing the likelihood of credit 
transactions. If, as the NELM and CCT literature suggest, households with access to 
remittances or CCTs are better able to smooth consumption and make new investments, 
there are reasons to believe that this change might be accompanied by an increase in the 
demand for credit, since credit would facilitate such changes in livelihood strategies. 
Similarly, a reduction in the household’s exposure to income risk may modify the 
lender’s expected marginal costs of offering a loan. These marginal costs are composed 
of the lender’s expected loss in case of default plus screening and monitoring costs 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 1984; Kochar, 1997). If access to transfers indeed reduces the 
borrower’s income risk and if the lender is aware of this change in risk profile, then 
expected losses in case of default should decrease, reducing the lender’s expected 
marginal costs of offering a loan amount and making it more likely for the household to 
apply for credit. 
However, although access to remittances and CCTs may improve the likelihood of 
participation in credit markets through a reduction in risk exposure, they may also reduce 
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the household’s benefit from a loan, given the assumption of decreasing marginal returns 
to additional income, as explained in the following section.  
3. A theoretical framework 
We present a simple graphical analysis that conceptualizes the process through which 
a transfer that is uncorrelated –or negatively correlated– to household income might 
affect its decision to request a loan. 
The household’s marginal returns from the use of its own resources and any other 
complement, such as a loan or a transfer, depend mainly on the production technology 
used and the market opportunities available, such as the price for its products or services. 
However, the final outcome of the production and income-generating process is 
uncertain, as there are several possible states of nature that may occur and that the 
household makes an effort to foresee. Therefore, the marginal returns to a given amount 
of resources (R) may be conceptualized as a distribution with a probability density 
function (PDF). Figure one shows an example of two PDFs for marginal returns obtained 
by using two different production technologies that a household with a given amount of 
resources may use.  
In Figure one, the PDF with a smaller variance represents all the potential marginal 
returns that the household would obtain by using a technology that is relatively ‘safe’ and 
the probability that each one of these marginal returns may be observed, given all 
possible states of nature. The technology is ‘safer’ in the sense that the potential marginal 
returns are concentrated around their mean value, MR1. However, the expected (mean) 
returns achieved by using this technology are lower than those obtained when using an 
alternative riskier technology. In this case, the potential marginal returns are more 
dispersed around their higher mean, MR2. Assuming that the household’s degree of risk 
aversion is given, the household will choose between these two production technologies 
(or input combinations) depending on its willingness to tolerate risk (namely, its risk 
behavior). A household that might not be well equipped to cope with unforeseen states of 
nature might be inclined to choose the safer technology, at the expense of a productivity 
loss. 
When considering whether to apply for a loan or not, the household compares the 
expected marginal returns from the use of its resources (plus the loan) to the marginal 
costs of the loan. Given the choice of a production technology or input mix, a schedule of 
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expected marginal returns, EMR(R), will reflect the expected outcomes from using 
different levels of resources. This schedule is shown in Figure two. In addition, this 
figure shows the household’s expected marginal costs of using different loan amounts, 
MC(L).  Each point along the EMR(R) schedule would be associated with a PDF of 
potential outcomes, as the ones described in Figure one. In addition, the household may 
also consider the penalties associated with default as well as the probability of this 
adverse outcome. It is thus possible that a household that is very weary of the risk of 
default would demand a loan size that is less than the size associated with the expected 
returns. This risk-adjusted expected marginal returns to resources are given by M1’ and 
M2’ in Figure one, and would determine the position of the EMR(R) curve. 
Next, we analyze how the household’s risk-adjusted expected marginal returns 
change as its resource endowment, R, increases due to the receipt of a transfer. In this 
example, the household has an initial resource endowment equivalent to Ro. 
The EMR(R) curve is downward sloping, reflecting the assumption of decreasing 
marginal returns to additional resources. The area under this curve represents total 
expected gross returns from the use of resources, for a given level of resource use. The 
position of the EMR(R) curve indicates how profitable the household is. As explained at 
the beginning of this section, the position of this curve depends on the choice of 
production technology made, the market opportunities available to the household, and the 
household’s willingness to tolerate risk. 
Figure two (a) shows how the household has an upward sloping MC(L) curve which 
is determined by the lender’s expected marginal costs of providing a loan plus the 
household’s transaction costs for applying. The curve is upward sloping because the risk 
of default increases proportionally more than the lender’s expected marginal returns, as 
the loan size augments. Therefore for the same loan product, larger loans are charged 
higher interest rates. The household will request a loan of size Ld such that its expected 
marginal returns equate its expected marginal costs, at point B in Figure two. At this 
point, the household’s total expected gross returns from the use of its own resources 
represented by the area under the EMR(R) curve to the left of Ro is complemented 
with the maximum expected net returns from the use of a loan represented by the area of 
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the triangle ABC. Notice that the cost of the loan is represented by the area under the 
MC(L) curve along the segment CB. 
What happens when the household receives a transfer, T? Holding all else equal, 
Figure two (b) shows that the household’s own resource endowment increases to   Ro + 
T. Due to diminishing marginal returns, any addition to the household’s use of resources 
such as a loan will contribute less to total expected returns than what it would have 
done before the transfer. This is represented by the reduction in the area of triangle ABC 
in the figure. Therefore, if the only change is an increase in the access to resources, the 
opportunity to increase the household’s total expected returns through a loan declines 
and, if the transfer is large enough, it might even disappear. Thus the receipt of the 
transfer would discourage the request of a loan. 
However, it is possible that transfers such as remittances or CCTs may cause 
additional changes, as explained in section 2. If the transfer reduces the household’s 
exposure to income risk and its weariness of credit default, this would imply that the 
EMR(R) curve would shifts upwards as shown in Figure three (a). Notice that, after this 
shift, total expected returns from the use of a loan increase to the amount represented by 
the new area ABC and make the loan more attractive for the household.  
In addition, if lenders are aware that the transfer received by the household lowers its 
exposure to income risk, then the lenders’ expected loss from default should decrease, 
shifting the MC(L) curve downwards. That is, the perception of the borrower’s 
creditworthiness improves. This is represented in figure three (b). The downward-shift of 
the MC(L) curve would further increase total expected returns from a loan, to the amount 
represented by the new area ABC, providing further incentive for the household to apply 
for a loan. Notice that, given the information asymmetries that exist in credit markets, 
lenders may not be aware of the effect of the transfer, and therefore the MC(L) may not 
shift even if the borrower’s expected marginal returns to the loan improve. 
In summary, there are three possible effects that a transfer may have on the 
household’s decision to apply for a loan and these have opposite signs. First, the decrease 
in expected marginal returns to resources after the receipt of the transfer reduces the 
opportunity to add to the household’s total expected returns through the use of a loan. 
Second, if the transfers were to protect the household from income risk, then this may 
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improve the household’s risk-adjusted expected marginal returns to resources, increasing 
the opportunity to profit from a loan. Third, the latter effect would be reinforced if 
lenders were able to detect the household’s lower risk profile, which would improve their 
perception of its creditworthiness. Therefore, the effect of such a transfer on credit 
market outcomes is theoretically ambiguous and determining the net result of these 
opposing forces on the household’s decision to request a loan is an empirical exercise. 
4. The RPS data 
To test the theoretical framework we use data from the RPS. This program began 
with a pilot phase carried out between 2000 and 2002, and it continued with a second 
phase from 2003 to 2005. The program consisted of the provision of an average cash 
transfer of US$300 per year to poor rural households in the form of a randomized field 
experiment. These transfers were given mostly to mothers and were conditional on the 
mother’s attendance to periodic health workshops, minimum improvements in child 
health indicators, children’s school attendance and children’s intake of anti-parasites, 
vitamins and vaccines (Maluccio and Flores, 2004). This study uses the data collected for 
the pilot phase. Year 2000 is the baseline year and years 2001 and 2002 are the after 
treatment periods. 
Table A1 in the Appendix shows attrition levels for the control and treatment groups 
for the baseline and follow-up surveys. Total attrition among treatment and control 
groups in the balanced panel looks similar, which may favor comparability. However, the 
randomization of the sample is valid only as long as this attrition is itself random. 
5. Data analysis and econometric model 
5.1 Verification of randomization and general characteristics of the sample 
The first step in this evaluation is to verify if attrition was random. Given that 
baseline data are available, we can compare attritors with non-attritors, to see if there are 
systematic differences between them that would bias results. For example, it is possible 
that those not so poor households that benefited from the program were able to migrate 
locally to other communities with better job opportunities, which would underestimate 
impact measures. Alternatively, those households benefiting the least from the RPS may 
have dropped out, which would imply an overestimation of impact measures. 
In order to test whether attrition was random, a mean difference test between attritors 
and non-attritors, as well as for the control and treatment groups, is made and results are 
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shown in Table one. The t-values are significant suggesting that attrition was likely non-
random leaving significant differences between control and treatment groups. 
 
Table 1. Mean difference test for non-attritors and attritors and for control and 
treatment groups in the baseline survey (year 2000).  
 Non-attritors 
n=1,359 
Attritors 
N=222 
Control 
n=653 
Treatment 
N=706 
Average age of adult members (those 15 years old or older) 
Mean 24.45 24.63 22.77 24.84 
t-statistic -0.45 -2.62*** 
p-value 0.65 0.01 
Percentage of households that requested a loan 
Mean 17.9 15.3 19.91 16.0 
t-statistic 0.97 1.87* 
p-value 0.33 0.06 
Percentage of households that report having a microenterprise 
Mean 12.29 13.06 11.48 13.03 
t-statistic -0.32 -0.87 
p-value 0.75 0.37 
Percentage of households participating in community organizations 
Mean 20.60 15.31 20.50 20.68 
t-statistic 1.99** -0.07 
p-value 0.05 0.94 
Per capita value of durable goods (Cordobas) 
Mean 399.16 297.54 375.11 421.41 
t-statistic 1.70* -0.80 
p-value 0.09 0.42 
Per capita annual consumption (Cordobas) 
Mean 3,885.08 3,854.27 3,738.24 4,020.90 
t-statistic 0.14 -1.83* 
p-value 0.89 0.07 
Average number of members living in the household 
Mean 6.18 5.94 6.31 6.07 
t-statistic 1.02 1.46 
p-value 0.31 0.14 
Percentage of households that received benefits from social programs other than RPS 
Mean 47.83 27.93 50.07 45.75 
t-statistic 6.01*** 1.59 
p-value <0.01 0.11 
Percentage of households with access to remittances 
Mean 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.06 
t-statistic -1.08 0.93 
p-value 0.28 0.35 
Value of remittances per year (Cordobas) 
Mean 131.08 166.46 121.77 139.69 
t-statistic -0.37 -0.23 
p-value 0.71 0.81 
Significant at the *90%, **95% and 99%*** confidence level. 
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Table one also offers a general idea of the level of poverty of households in the 
sample. Households in control and treatment groups have young adult members. The 
average age of all members 15 years old or older was 23 years. Around 17 percent of the 
households applied for a loan during the 12 months before the baseline survey. The proxy 
we use to represent credit market outcomes is whether the household applied for a loan or 
not. This request is influenced by both the household’s demand and supply of credit, 
which is of interest for our analysis as it also considers the characteristics of those 
households that decide not to apply for a loan. 
In addition, the survey asks whether the loan was requested from formal sources 
(banks, NGOs or credit cooperatives) or informal sources (such as relatives, neighbors, 
friends, money lenders, input suppliers, crop buyers, and the like), which cover most of 
the places where the households may seek a loan. 
Although there is great heterogeneity among the types of credit suppliers that reach 
the poorest population in rural Nicaragua, loans from the available sources are 
characterized by short terms to maturity. Dauner (1998) is perhaps the most 
comprehensive analysis of the characteristics of rural financial markets in Nicaragua. She 
reports that 90 percent of the loans granted during 1995 to a representative group of rural 
households had a repayment period of less than a year. Among the poorest sector of the 
rural population, the only use reported for these short-term loans were for consumption 
and the purchase of fertilizer and seeds. 
In 2000, about seven percent of the households in the RPS reported having access to 
remittances where access refers to having a migrant who is able to send them 
remittances either periodically or just in case of an idiosyncratic shock . The concept of 
remittances used in the survey was that of some assistance, either in cash or in kind, from 
relatives or friends that emigrated domestically or internationally. 
Migration flows for the household sample are mainly temporary. Only 1.3 percent of 
households that reported access to remittances had this benefit during the three years 
observed. In addition, 86 percent of these recipient households reported that remittances 
came only from domestic migration, while 9 percent reported remittances from 
international migration, and 5 percent from both types of migration. Looking at the 
households that reported the receipt of remittances, the frequency with which these are 
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received varies. Although most remittances are sent on a monthly basis, as shown in 
Table two, some households report receiving them once every semester or once every 
year. 
There is a distinction between access and actual receipt of remittances that is relevant 
in our analysis. Sample households that have access to remittances are later asked if, by 
the time the survey was conducted, they had actually received any remittances and their 
value. Because many households seem to receive remittances sporadically depending on 
idiosyncratic shocks, there are many households that had not received remittances by the 
time of the survey, although they report having access to these transfers. It is then the 
ability to access remittances should future shocks occur, not whether the household had 
received remittances by the time of the survey, what is being captured in our the analysis. 
 
Table 2. Frequency of remittances sent by migrants during 2000, 2001 and 2002. 
 2000 (%) 2001 (%) 2002 (%) 
Biweekly 17.1 11.2 10.9 
Monthly 25.0 32.5 44.5 
Trimester 26.3 18.7 13.9 
Semester 21.0 16.2 17.8 
Annually 10.5 21.2 12.8 
Number of migrants 
sending remittances 
to households back 
home 
76 80 101 
Number of 
households that 
received remittances 
during the year 
52 (60) 63 (76) 88 (100) 
All numbers are percentages, except for the last two rows, which refer to number of 
households. The numbers in parenthesis are the percentage of households that 
received remittances from the total that reported access to remittances 
 
In summary, baseline survey shows these rural households are characterized by 
having young members. They make little use of credit and few of them have access to 
remittances mostly from temporary and domestic migrants. They would be categorized as 
very poor when using as a threshold an average per capita consumption of less than a 
dollar a day. These characteristics coincide well with the livelihood of the poor in many 
parts of the world as described by Banerjee and Duflo (2006). 
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5.2 Impact estimates for access to CCTs 
In section 5.1, we present evidence of intrinsic observable differences between 
treatment and control groups in the balanced panel, despite randomization, which violates 
the conditions under which OLS impact estimates are valid. Previous studies analyzing 
the RPS have argued these differences may be time-invariant and, under this parallel 
trend assumption, the double difference (DD) of means between groups would yield 
unbiased impact measures (Maluccio and Flores, 2004). In addition to using the DD 
technique, we explicitly account for the selection bias caused by non-random attrition 
using a Heckman two-step model (Heckman, 1979), which allows us to explicitly account 
for attrition in the presence of time-variant differences. Despite distributional 
assumptions regarding the error terms, this method for identifying attrition mechanisms 
has been shown to yield point estimates that are consistent with those obtained with semi-
parametric and non-parametric methods in the context of randomized control trials that 
suffer non-random attrition (Grasdal, 2001). 
Following Duflo et al. (2007), the specification we use to estimate the DD impact 
estimate is given below: 

Yit   t1  t2   Pi a t1 Pi b t2 Pi it  (1) 
Where Yit is equal to 1 if the household requested a loan and zero otherwise; 

t1  and 

t2 
are dummies for the years 2001 and 2002, once the program was implemented. Pi has a 
value of 1 if the household was assigned to the treatment group, and zero otherwise. The 
parameters of interest are a and b , which represent the mean program effects for 2001 
and 2002 relative to 2000. The random error of the estimated equation is given by . 
An important consideration in this case, is the fact that the RPS randomized treatment 
at the comarca level, not at the household level. Comarcas are administrative areas that 
include several communities and are determined by the National Institute of Statistics and 
Censuses. This randomization procedure creates a problem of grouped error terms that 
may cause the variance covariance matrix of the OLS estimation of DD estimates to be 
block-diagonal with correlation among error terms within each comarca cell. To get an 
improvement in the estimation of standard errors we use block bootstrapping as shown by 
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Efron and Tibshirani (1994), which has been shown to better account for the possibility 
of serial correlation in addition to error clustering
3
. 
Throughout, a linear probability model is used because it allows for parameter 
estimates that are more tractable, easier to interpret and flexible in handling unobserved 
heterogeneity relative to tobit or logit models (Hyslop, 1999; de Janvry et al., 2006). 
The results presented in Table three show that both the DD and the Heckman two-
step impact estimates are statistically insignificant, although positive. The significance of 
the inverse Mills’ ratio in the selection model suggests attrition bias is present and is 
accounted for. 
Table 3. CCT impact estimates on credit request obtained through the Double 
Difference (column I) and the Heckman two-step selection model (column II). 
Selected parameters
a 
Credit request (I) Credit request (II) 
T1 
-0.047** 
(0.021) 
-0.107*** 
(0.040) 
t2 
-0.083*** 
(0.019) 
-0.168*** 
(0.045) 
Pi 
-0.039** 
(0.020) 
-0.046* 
(0.025) 
a  
0.016 
(0.027) 
0.018 
(0.036) 
b  
0.027 
(0.025) 
0.050 
(0.032) 
Inverse Mills’ ratio - 
-0.591** 
(0.298) 
Number of observations 4,077 4,077 
Censored Observations - 215 
Significant at the * 90%, ** 95% and *** 99% confidence level. Bootstrapped standard errors are 
shown in parenthesis. 
a
Other variables included in the Heckman two-step model include number of men, women and 
children, average age of members over 15 years of age, dummy for whether the home plot is owned 
with or without a title, reported value of home, participation in programs other than RPS, participation 
in community organizations, existence of a microenterprise. 
 
                                                 
3 Block bootstrapping was found to yield robust standard errors relative to clustering techniques, given that is accounts 
for the possibility of serial correlation common in data with large time series (Bertrand et al. 2004). In practice we take 
200 random household samples with replacement from each comarca matrix and, for each household, we keep the 
entire time series of variables and time and household dummies. For every random sample we compute our estimated 
parameters,

 j
^
, where j is the independent variable of interest. We then compute the bootstrapped standard error as: 

seboot(
^
j ) 
1
2001
(
^
j,n

j )
2
n1
200
  where 



j
 is the usual sample mean 



j 1
200

^
j ,n
n1
200
 . 
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In the context of our theoretical framework, results suggest that even if the RPS 
improved marginal expected returns to a loan or the household’s creditworthiness as 
perceived by lenders, these effects were largely offset by the decrease in expected 
marginal returns to additional income caused by CCTs. The possible reasons for this 
likely relate to the characteristic of the transfer. It has been shown that RPS households 
used part of the transfer to make investments related to education, health and nutrition 
that they would have not otherwise made. Therefore from the fixed transfer amount 
received periodically, a fraction is saved in order to cope with future negative shocks. 
However this saving does not necessarily coincides with the timing or the magnitude of 
future negative shocks, which represents a limit in the level of risk protection that CCTs 
may offer.  
Another possible explanation for the lack of influence of CCTs on loan requests may 
relate to the fact that the RPS provided transfers mostly to women. We argue that gender-
differentiated use of transfers and credit can be ruled out in the following section, as we 
gain further insights on the household’s use of remittances. In addition, the perceptions 
about the permanence of the RPS might provide some explanation of results. If the 
households do not know how long they will be able to receive the program’s benefits it is 
unlikely that household expectations about the future will suffer major changes. As it is 
common in impact studies, the mechanisms that produce net results are not easy to 
isolate, and we can only discuss the several possible causes and rule out unlikely 
scenarios. 
5.3 Impact estimates for access to remittances 
Contrary to CCTs, migration and consequently access to remittances is the result of a 
household strategy. To control for the self-selection problem this entails we use two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) with an instrumental variable (IV) to estimate the impact of access 
to remittances on the decision to request a loan, as shown by Angrist (2001). In the 
household sample used, remittances come mostly from temporary and domestic 
migration. Thus any inference is limited to this particular migration typology, which 
seems prevalent among the poorest rural households in developing countries (Banerjee 
and Duflo, 2006; Mendola, 2008).  
 We take the household as the unit of analysis, including all migrant members. This 
follows the NELM theoretical framework that conceptualizes migration as a strategy of 
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the whole spatially diversified family. Then we estimate the following system of 
equations: 
MititMitibia
s
sit
itititibia
s
sit
ZXPtPttthM
MXPtPttthY




43212211
43212211
 (2) 
Where s are household fixed effects to capture observable and unobservable time-
invariant heterogeneity; 

t1,2 are year dummies for 2001 and 2002 that capture contextual 
variables common to all households; a and b are the impact estimates of CCTs on the 
decision to request a loan in 2002 and 2003, which we include as a robustness check of 
DD estimates; 

X it  are a set of time-variant observable characteristics influencing the 
decision to request a loan; and 

it  is the random error of the estimated equation. 
The ‘first stage’ equation determines the endogenous variable 

Mit  equal to 1 if 
household i has access to migrant remittances during year t and zero otherwise;  s,1,2 are, 
again, household and time fixed effects; a and b are CCTs impact estimates on access 
to remittances in 2002 and 2003; 

XMit  is a set of observable time-variant characteristics 
that influence access to migrant remittances; 

ZMit is an exogenous variable used as an 
instrument; and 

Mit  is the equation’s random error term. The parameter estimate 4 is the 
one of interest, as it represents the impact of access to remittances on the decision to 
apply for a loan. A linear probability model is used to determine equation (2), given the 
ease of interpretation it provides and its flexibility under unobserved heterogeneity 
(Angrist, 2001; Hysloop, 1999). The set 

XMit  has a union with set 

X it  and both sets are 
selected based on the migration and financial literature, as shown in Table four. 
The key part of our analysis is finding an instrument, ZMit, that is highly correlated 
with access to remittances but not correlated with the household’s decision to request a 
loan, such that the influence of remittances on this decision is obtained only through this 
instrument. The IV procedure would allow for consistent estimates by taking into account 
the correlation in the disturbances across the two equations in (2) (Angrist, 2001).  
The instrumental variable proposed is the percentage of households within the 
community with at least one migrant. This IV serves as a proxy for migrant networks, 
which have been shown to facilitate migration through a reduction of transaction costs, 
the creation of job referrals, and acquiring knowledge about economic opportunities 
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outside the community (Massey and Espinosa, 1997; Munshi, 2003). But the initial 
formation of migrant networks has important determinants that are non-economic. 
Following the cumulative causation theory of migration, once a member of the 
community migrates it starts a cumulative process that changes the culture and values 
towards migration within members living in the origin community (Massey et al., 1993). 
For example, migration may become a ‘rite of passage’ of life, and those young men and 
women who do not attempt to elevate their status through migration to big cities or other 
countries are looked down-upon. This ‘social learning’ shapes the household’s migration 
behavior and determines whether or not it has access to remittances. However, given its 
non-economic determinants, it remains orthogonal to the household’s productivity and its 
expected marginal returns and cost of a loan
4
. We argue the cumulative theory of 
migration best explains migration behavior in the sample, and that there are no general 
equilibrium effects within communities. The data allows us to provide evidence 
supporting this claim. 
The orthogonality of the IV with the decision to request a loan should be enhanced by 
the fact that we are able to control for intrinsic differences between communities through 
two-way fixed effects. We are able to check the robustness of the 2SLS procedure by 
adding time-community fixed effects to equation (2). This procedure controls for any 
seasonal systemic shocks common to all households within the community. Since 
remittances and credit are likely correlated with shocks, it is important to control for 
these as best as possible. To incorporate time-community fixed effects we modify the 
proposed IV to represent the incidence of migration at the comarca level, which is a 
larger geographical area than the community. 
Table four presents the impact estimates obtained. Column I shows parameter 
estimates for the first-stage regression, which identifies determinants of access to 
remittances. We find that the proposed IV positively and significantly influences access 
to remittances, consistent with the migration literature. Another relevant result is that 
CCTs had a positive effect on household access to remittances only for year 2002, 
although significant at the ten percent level. It may be that, over time, households 
                                                 
4 Other studies that exploit the non-economic determinants of migrant networks in order to measure the economic 
impact of migration on origin communities include Rozzelle, et al., 1999; Munshi, 2003; and Mendola, 2008. 
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receiving CCTs may be able to save a fraction of the transfer to finance the cost of 
migrating. However, this result is not robust, as estimating the effect through DD and the 
Heckman two-step selection model yields impact estimates that are not significant, as 
shown in table five. 
 
Table 4. Determinants of access to remittances and the request of a loan at the 
household level using two-way fixed effects as shown in equation (2). 
Parameter 
Access to remittances 
(I) 
Credit request 
a
 
(II) 
Credit request 
b
 
(III) 
a / a  
-0.003 
(0.019) 
0.023 
(0.024) 
0.020 
(0.027) 
b / b 
0.027* 
(0.016) 
0.023 
(0.025) 
0.015 
(0.029) 
Number of men in hh 
-0.029** 
(0.016) 
0.004 
(0.021) 
-0.017 
(0.024) 
Number of women in hh 
-0.009 
(0.015) 
-0.003 
(0.021) 
-0.007 
(0.024) 
Number of children in hh 
-0.009 
(0.012) 
-0.008 
(0.017) 
-0.006 
(0.022) 
Average age of hh members 
0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
Homeownership 
c 0.014 
(0.021) 
-0.007 
(0.027) 
-0.012 
(0.026) 
Self-reported value of home 
(1000s Cordobas)
 
0.033
 
(0.028) 
-0.040
 
(0.042)  
-0.060
 
(0.047) 
Shock 
d 0.009 
(0.017) 
0.028 
(0.026) 
0.029 
(0.026) 
Participation in programs other 
than RPS 
0.024** 
(0.012) 
0.029** 
(0.015) 
0.032** 
(0.016) 
Proxy of migrant 
networks in community 
e 
0.075*** 
(0.008) 
- 
0.008 
(0.007) 
Participation in community 
organizations 
0.002 
(0.013) 
0.058*** 
(0.02) 
0.062*** 
(0.020) 
Existence of a microenterprise 
-0.019 
(0.017) 
0.017 
(0.022) 
0.058** 
(0.025) 
Access to remittances - 
0.252** 
(0.108) 
- 
Number of observations 4,077 4,077 3,387 
Note: Significant at the * 90%, ** 95% and *** 99% confidence level. Bootstrapped standard errors are 
shown in parenthesis. 
a
 Second-stage regression for the decision to request a loan using the complete balanced panel, which 
includes households with and without access to remittances during each of the years observed 
b
 Second-stage regression for the decision to request a loan for the subgroup of households in the balanced 
panel that did not have access to remittances in any of the years observed. 
c
 Dummy for whether the home plot is owned with or without title 
d
 Whether the household suffered a shock related to theft, lack of work, low yield, presence of drought or 
flood and bad coffee prices 
e
 The proxy is the percentage of households in the home community or comarca participating in migration 
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The second-stage regression, shown in column II of Table four, identifies the 
determinants of the household’s loan application. Access to CCTs did not seem to 
influence the decision to request a loan, consistent with the DD impact estimates 
previously obtained. In contrast, the effect of predicted access to remittances on the 
decision to apply for a loan is significant and the estimated coefficient has a large 
positive magnitude. Based on the theoretical framework presented, this can occur only 
through an increase in household expected marginal returns to a loan or an improvement 
in loan terms and condition that reduce expected marginal costs of a loan, or both. The 
positive impact estimates suggests these two forces dominate over the decrease in 
marginal returns that the household faces, as its liquidity increases with remittances. 
The data allow us to explore the validity of the IV used to obtain these results. 
Column III of Table four shows that the incidence of migration at the community level 
does not explain the decision to request a loan for the sub-group of households that had 
no access to remittances in any of the years observed. This group of households is 
presumably excluded from the ‘social learning’ provided by migrant networks present in 
their communities, and therefore their decision to apply for a loan is made independently. 
This would also rule out general equilibrium effects through which migration flows might 
affect the community’s economy as a whole. Given the low incidence of migration and 
its temporary and domestic nature, this is not surprising. In addition, the Hausman test for 
endogeneity yields a Hausman statistic of 6.7 with 16 degrees of freedom. Therefore the 
null hypothesis that both OLS and IV estimates are consistent can be rejected at the 95 
percent confidence level. This favors the alternative that the IV estimates are consistent. 
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Table 5. CCT impact estimates on household access to remittances obtained through 
the Double Difference (column I) and the Heckman two-step selection model 
(column II). 
Parameter 
Access to remittances 
(I) 
Access to remittances 
(II) 
t1 
0.006 
(0.015) 
 0.049 
 (0.038) 
t2 
-0.011 
(0.015) 
-0.095 
 (0.049) 
Pi 
-0.012 
(0.014) 
 -0.013 
  (0.014)  
a  
-0.017 
(0.020) 
-0.015 
(0.021)  
b  
0.022 
(0.020) 
0.036 
(0.024)  
Inverse Mills’ ratio - 
-0.451 
(0.309)  
Number of observations 4,077 4077 
Censored observations - 215 
Note: Significant at the * 90%, ** 95% and *** 99% confidence level. Bootstrapped standard errors 
are shown in parenthesis. 
 
We also find evidence for the non-economic determinants of migrant networks in the 
sample. Further statistical analysis suggests that wealth does not seem to explain the size 
of migrant networks at the community and comarca level during any of the years 
observed. Tables A2 to A4 in the Appendix, show that households living in communities 
and comarcas with the largest migrant networks are no wealthier than those living in 
equivalent areas with smaller migrant networks. Therefore, migration behavior does not 
seem to be driven by economic factors. Rather, it seems to be explained by the ‘social 
learning’ that occurs through migrant networks, which we proxy with the proposed IV. 
In an effort to control better for unobserved systemic shocks at the community level, 
we estimate equation (2) by adding time-community fixed effects. The positive impact of 
access to remittances on household loan applications continues to hold, as shown in Table 
six. Evidence for the validity of the IV is still found after including time-community 
effects. 
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Table 6. Determinants of access to remittances and the request of a loan at the 
household level adding time-community fixed effects to equation (2). 
Parameter 
Access to remittances 
(I) 
Credit request 
a
 
(II) 
Credit request 
b
 
(III) 
a / a  
-0.034 
(0.028) 
0.018 
(0.044) 
0.074 
(0.043) 
b / b 
0.054* 
(0.030) 
0.015 
(0.042) 
0.047 
(0.044) 
Number of men in hh 
-0.040** 
(0.017) 
0.022 
(0.028) 
-0.028 
(0.026) 
Number of women in hh 
-0.013 
(0.015) 
-0.002 
(0.025) 
-0.029 
(0.027) 
Number of children in hh 
-0.005 
(0.016) 
0.015 
(0.020) 
0.008 
(0.019) 
Average age of hh members 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
Homeownership 
c 0.006 
(0.024) 
-0.032 
(0.027) 
-0.037 
(0.028) 
Self-reported value of home 
(1000s Cordobas) 
0.038
 
(0.032) 
-0.055
 
(0.035)  
-0.050
 
(0.049) 
Shock 
d 0.006 
(0.017) 
0.027 
(0.025) 
0.027 
(0.028) 
Participation in programs other 
than RPS 
0.027* 
(0.012) 
0.005 
(0.018) 
0.021 
(0.017) 
Proxy of migrant 
Networks in comarca 
e 
0.050*** 
(0.004) 
- 0.006 
(0.005) 
Participation in community 
organizations 
0.004 
(0.018) 
0.043** 
(0.019) 
0.041* 
(0.022) 
Existence of a microenterprise 
-0.010 
(0.016) 
0.044** 
(0.022) 
0.064** 
(0.022) 
Access to remittances 
- 0.494** 
(0.242) 
- 
Number of observations 4,077 4,077 3,387 
Significant at the * 90%, ** 95% and *** 99% confidence level. Bootstrapped standard errors are 
shown in parenthesis. 
a
 Second stage regression for the decision to request a loan using the complete balanced panel, which 
includes households with and without access to remittances during each of the years observed 
b
 Second stage regression for the decision to request a loan for the subgroup of households in the 
balanced panel that did not receive remittances in any of the years observed 
c
 Dummy whether the owned the home plot with or without title 
d
 Whether the household suffered a shock related to theft, lack of work, low yield, presence of drought 
or flood and bad coffee prices 
e
 The proxy is the percentage of households in the home comarca participating in migration 
 
An important consideration for our analysis is that the proxy for migrant networks is 
time-variant, enabling the inclusion of fixed effects. Table A5 in the Appendix shows that 
the average incidence of migration at the community and comarca level has been 
increasing over the time period observed. Therefore, the process of ‘social learning’ 
about migration seems to be growing over time. Indeed, at the national level, rural to 
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urban and urban to urban migration flows have been growing steadily in Nicaragua 
during the past decade (Vivas-Viachica, 2007). 
5.4 Gender and access to CCTs and remittances 
It is possible that the different impact estimates obtained for access to CCTs and 
remittances are the result of different uses given to them by men and women. As 
mentioned previously, the RPS provided CCTs mostly to women. Table A6 in the 
Appendix shows that migration flows observed are dominated by male migrants who 
send remittances to their spouses or partners. This would suggest that, similar to CCTs, 
remittances are mostly received by women. This is a tendency that seems to hold at the 
national level, as census data for 2001 shows men dominate rural to urban and urban to 
rural migration flows (Vivas-Viachica, 2007). Given that women in the sample tend to 
receive both CCTs and remittances, it is unlikely that gender-differentiated use of 
transfers explains the different impact estimates obtained for access to CCTs and 
remittances. 
6. Conclusions 
The main purpose of this study is to explore how access to remittances and CCTs 
may affect household participation in credit markets via changes in credit demand and 
supply. The induced change in this household decision reveals potential changes in its 
expected marginal returns to a loan or in its creditworthiness as evaluated by lenders and 
the literature provides reasons to believe that both, CCTs and remittances, may have this 
type of effect. Impact estimates obtained suggest that access to CCTs did not affect the 
household’s decision to apply for a loan, while access to remittances increased its 
likelihood. 
Based on the theoretical framework presented, the empirical results supports the 
claim that the protection from income risk provided by access to remittances seems to 
improve the household’s expected marginal returns to a loan by enabling it to cope better 
with negative shocks or by favoring the adoption of riskier but more productive 
technology, as evidenced by the literature. It may also be that lenders perceive the 
household’s lower risk exposure and improve the loan terms and conditions offered in a 
way that lowers the household’s expected marginal costs of a loan. This improvement in 
expectations favoring the request of a loan seems to more than offset the effect of 
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decreasing marginal returns that the household faces once its liquidity rises after the 
receipt of remittances. The latter effect discourages the request of a loan. 
The positive but statistically insignificant impact estimate obtained for access to 
CCTs suggests that even though access to these transfers might be causing an 
improvement in household expectations similar to that caused by access to remittances, 
this effect seems to be largely offset by the decrease in marginal returns to additional 
income caused by the receipt of the CCT. 
The characteristics of these two types of transfers likely explain their different impact 
on the household’s decision to request a loan. We argue that, by design, CCTs are not as 
flexible in responding to income fluctuations relative to remittances. The amount of the 
CCT and the frequency with which it is received are set exogenously and do not 
necessarily coincide with the timing and magnitude of idiosyncratic shocks. Remittances, 
in contrast, tend to coincide better with household shocks given that they are the result of 
a household income risk management strategy, as evidenced by the NELM literature. 
This means that access to remittances should have a larger effect than that of access to 
CCTs on the household’s expected marginal returns to a loan or its creditworthiness as 
perceived by lenders. 
Another possible reason for CCTs having no effect on the household loan application 
is perhaps related to how permanent the CCT program is. If households do not know how 
long they will be able to receive the program’s benefits it is unlikely that these 
households make significant changes in investment and consumption decisions that 
require predictions about future states of nature. On the contrary, even if migration is 
only temporary, like the case of households participating in the RPS, the decision to 
access remittances is made by these households. Therefore the option of accessing 
remittances may be more permanent that the option of accessing CCTs from the 
household’s perspective. We are able to rule out the possibility of gender-differentiated 
use of transfers as an explanation for the different impact estimates obtained. 
Our findings contribute to understanding how much public and private transfers may 
change household exposure to risk, and how these changes may have far reaching effects 
on household decisions, specifically in their participation in rural credit markets. Those 
transfers that best protect households from income risk seem to favor financial 
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deepening. And this is an externality that has important implications in the process of 
economic development. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: PDFs for marginal returns obtained by using two different production 
technologies for a household with a given amount of resources (R). 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 2: The household’s risk adjusted expected marginal returns, E MR(R), and its 
marginal costs of a loan, MC (L), before and after the receipt of a transfer, T. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 3: The possible effect of a transfer, T, on the position of the borrower’s 
E MR(R) curve, and the borrower’s MC(L) curve. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Households participating in the RPS baseline and follow-up surveys 
(percentage of attrition shown in parenthesis). 
 Baseline 2000 Follow-up 2001 Follow-up 2002 
Completed 
interview 
1,581 
(10.4) 
1,453 
(8.1) 
1,397 
(11.6) 
     Treatment group 
810 
(8.2) 
766 
(5.4) 
722 
(10.9) 
     Control group 
771 
(12.6) 
687 
(10.9) 
675 
(12.4) 
Completed 
interviews in 3 
rounds 
1,359 
(23.0) 
1,359 
(14.0) 
1,359 
(14.0) 
    Treatment group 
706 
(20.0) 
706 
(12.8) 
706 
(12.8) 
    Control group 
653 
(26.0) 
653 
(10.5) 
653 
(10.5) 
Source: Maluccio and Flores, 2004. Both follow-up surveys were targeted for baseline respondents 
thus there are some households that participated in 2001 but not in 2002 and vice-versa, causing the 
balanced panel to consist of 1,359 households instead of 1,397. 
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Table A2. Mean difference test for household wealth indicators present in communities 
and comarcas with migrant networks above and below the median during 2000
 
 Communities 
with migrant 
networks below 
the median 
n=695 
Communities 
with migrant 
networks above 
the median 
N=664 
Comarcas with 
migrant 
networks below 
the median 
n=733 
Comarcas with 
migrant 
networks above 
the median 
N=626 
Per capita annual consumption (Cordobas) 
Mean 3792.27 4045.02 3783.17 3972.12 
t-statistic -1.72* 1.21 
p-value 0.07 0.22 
Per capita value of durable goods (Cordobas) 
Mean 363.23 436.76 330.65 439.39 
t-statistic -1.26 -1.57 
p-value 0.20 0.14 
Self-reported value of the home plot (Cordobas) 
Mean 12461.03 14793.75 12562.62 14932.79 
t-statistic -0.58 -0.59 
p-value 0.55 0.55 
Homeownership dummy 
Mean 0.81 0.82 0.84 0.80 
t-statistic -0.50 1.62 
p-value 0.61 0.12 
 
Table A3. Mean difference test for household wealth indicators present in communities 
and comarcas with migrant networks above and below the median during 2001
 
 Communities 
with migrant 
networks below 
the median 
n=729 
Communities 
with migrant 
networks above 
the median 
N=630 
Comarcas with 
migrant 
networks below 
the median 
n=705 
Comarcas with 
migrant 
networks above 
the median 
N=654 
Per capita annual consumption (Cordobas) 
Mean 3972.32 3717.85 4007.68 3885.73 
t-statistic 1.60 1.61 
p-value 0.14 0.15 
Per capita value of durable goods (Cordobas) 
Mean 329.83 498.38 380.98 510.30 
t-statistic -2.10** -1.55 
p-value 0.04 0.11 
Self-reported value of the home plot (Cordobas) 
Mean 8409.59 9313.09 8438.94 9547.72 
t-statistic -1.37 1.72* 
p-value 0.17 0.09 
Homeownership dummy 
Mean 0.82 0.84 0.87 0.86 
t-statistic -0.99 1.53 
p-value 0.32 0.15 
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Table A4. Mean difference test for household wealth indicators present in communities 
and comarcas with migrant networks above and below the median during 2002.
 
 Communities 
with migrant 
networks below 
the median 
n=694 
Communities 
with migrant 
networks above 
the median 
N=665 
Comarcas with 
migrant 
networks below 
the median 
n=733 
Comarcas with 
migrant 
networks above 
the median 
N=626 
Per capita annual consumption (Cordobas) 
Mean 3963.46 3794.76 3782.00 3996.72 
t-statistic 1.09 -1.39 
p-value 0.27 0.16 
Per capita value of durable goods (Cordobas) 
Mean 453.85 374.39 447.97 376.32 
t-statistic 1.33 1.19 
p-value 0.18 0.23 
Self-reported value of the home plot (Cordobas) 
Mean 7266.62 8064.15 7125.12 8258.37 
t-statistic -1.12 -1.59 
p-value 0.26 0.11 
Homeownership dummy 
Mean 0.86 0.88 0.82 0.85 
t-statistic 1.62 1.59 
p-value 0.14 0.12 
 
 
Table A5. Average incidence of migration within communities and comarcas. 
Average incidence of 
migration: 
2000 2001 2002 
At the community level (%) 6.79 
(1.67) 
6.83 
(1.45) 
6.89 
(4.90) 
At the comarca level (%) 6.63  
(3.71) 
6.85 
(4.78) 
6.87 
(2.79) 
Standard deviation measures are shown in parenthesis 
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Table A6. Migrants’ gender and their relationship to the household’s head. 
  Migrant’s relationship with the head of the origin household 
Migrant’s 
Gender 
Migrants 
in the 
sample 
Spouse/Partner  Daughter/Son Sister/Brother Cousin Other 
2000 
Female 
32 
(42.10) 
1 
(3.12) 
15 
(46.87) 
3 
(9.37) 
2 
(6.25) 
11 
(34.37) 
Male 
44 
(57.90) 
23 
(52.27) 
4 
(9.09) 
3 
(6.82) 
2 
(4.54) 
12 
(27.27) 
2001 
Female 
35 
(43.75) 
2 
(5.71) 
19 
(54.28) 
5 
(14.28) 
1 
(2.86) 
8 
(22.86) 
Male 
45 
(56.25) 
25 
(55.55) 
7 
(15.55) 
4 
(8.89) 
0 
(0.00) 
9 
(20.00) 
2002 
Female 
49 
(48.51) 
2 
(4.08) 
23 
(46.94) 
5 
(10.20) 
2 
(4.08) 
17 
(34.69) 
Male 
52 
(51.49) 
28 
(53.85) 
9 
(17.31) 
4 
(7.69) 
1 
(1.92) 
10 
(19.23) 
Numbers in parenthesis represent percentage of total value. Most migrants are male sending remittances to 
spouses. 
 
 
 
